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Abstract 
 
This study assess how manager’s characteristics may influence leverage decisions. Using data 
from European banks, the results show that younger managers are risk-prone and less 
conservative in leverage decisions. Moreover, it is observed that for higher levels of leverage more 
experienced managers tend to increase leverage. This is also true for managers with a longer 
tenure as they may bring their personal preferences towards risk and in this sense they will be 
more able to increase leverage. However, this effect differs according to the level of leverage at 
the manager’s appointment date. The inclusion of the decision horizon seems to validate the idea 
that a short-term managerial horizon enhances the self-interested behaviour of the manager and 
this may be reflected on capital structure decisions. 
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 1. Introduction 
Excessive leverage has governance implications and encompasses agency problems, in that managers 
may pursue rent-seeking strategies that are detrimental to the long-term financial stability and 
profitability of the bank.  
Since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), several studies have contributed to the 
development of the literature that explores the determinants of capital structure. The absence of a 
universal theory of capital structure is reflected in the extent of the empirical literature on this topic 
(see Frank and Goyal (2008, 2009) for a concise review of this literature). However, three main 
theoretical strands have emerged: the Trade-Off Theory; the Pecking Order Theory and the Market 
Timing Theory. According to the Trade-Off Theory (Myers, 1984) firms will balance the costs and 
benefits of debt in order to achieve an optimal capital structure. Firms should attempt to balance the 
benefit of debt as tax benefits with the costs associated with increasing levels of debt such as 
bankruptcy costs and agency costs. The Pecking Order Theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) is based 
on the existence of information asymmetry, considering that firms follow a financing hierarchy 
designed to minimize adverse selection costs of security issuance. By doing so, firms show a distinct 
preference between internal and external funds with investments to be financed first with internal 
funds, second with secured debt, and finally with equity. The Market Timing Theory (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002) argues that firms issue new equity when their share price is perceived to be overvalued 
and buy back shares when they are undervalued. This fluctuation in the price of shares affects the 
way how firms finance their investment decisions and the capital structure of the firm. 
The focus of most empirical work has been on non-financial firms and, concerning a bank’s 
capital structure, there are clear similarities on the determinants of financing decisions. However, the 
banking sector is not only different for many reasons to other non-financial firms, but also agency 
costs may be high in this particular industry. As pointed out by Berger and Patti (2006), 
notwithstanding the banking sector’s activity being restricted by regulation, banks are also subject to 
the same type of agency problems and their behaviour is also influenced by the same factors as other 
industries.  
Considering the relation between leverage and the rent- and risk-seeking behaviour of bankers, 
Avgouleas and Cullen (2015) consider that leverage constitutes a cheap and fast way to increase size, 
thus the expansion of bank assets will generate an increase in returns (by the increase in the return 
3 
 
on equity – ROE), at least in the short term. Thus, as leverage leads to an increase in size and to the 
maximization of the shareholders’ returns, it is expected that managers will pursue this kind of strategy 
not only to imitate competitor strategies, but also to retain their jobs and career prospects. This 
behaviour encompasses an agency cost, as their risk seeking behaviour may harm the long-term 
profitability and financial stability of the bank. 
In line with Berger and Patti (2006) the separation of ownership and management is a source of 
agency costs, so this problem may be overcome with the choice of capital structure. In this sense, 
debt may serve as a corporate governance tool and a discipline device for managers. Since bankruptcy 
is costly for managers, a high level of leverage will constrain and motivate managers to act according 
to the shareholders’ interests. The authors state that high leverage may reduce agency costs, as 
managers perceive the risk they will incur if the firm is liquidated, namely in terms of salary losses 
and other benefits as well as a bad reputation.  
By focusing on the banking industry, we want to consider its specificities. Banks differ in many 
ways from non-financial firms. However, there are two elements which are central regarding the 
differences in the corporate governance of banks: the use of excessive leverage and the strong 
regulated environment in which banks develop their activities (Hagendorff, 2014).  
Given the high use of leverage that prevails in the banking sector, it is natural to try to find what 
factors favour the use of leverage, instead of equity in financing banks. Avgouleas and Cullen (2015: 
7) set out four possible drivers: the rent-seeking behaviour of managers, especially in the absence of 
regulatory controls, that may lead to an increased use of uninsured debt to finance bank assets and 
a greater risk; bank management may use asset substitution (risk-shifting), in order to substitute 
investment decisions and select those that are riskier (this behaviour increases as banks increase 
their leverage and it prevails in financial firms, since the opaque environment in which banks operate 
hinders the flow of information and the evaluation of the risk of their operations); risk preferences 
differ between the agents that dominate the decision process, thus it is expected that a high level of 
risk will be preferred by shareholder dominated banks, followed by manager-dominated banks, and 
finally, by banks dominated by deposit guarantors; financial innovation and the use of leverage have 
led to a rapid expansion of the banking business.  In addition, Hegendorff (2014) mentions that a 
safety net system is also responsible for high leverage. In this sense, the idea that regulators may 
subsidize bank leverage, constitutes an incentive for banks to issue leverage.  
The specificity of banks is also stated in Koudstall and Wijnbergen (2012) which consider their 
crucial role for the functioning of the economy and their high exposure to risk. The special features of 
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the banking sector give the idea that corporate governance and, to a certain extent, the determinants 
of capital structure of banks, differ from non-financial firms. Notwithstanding the differences between 
banks and non-financial firms, it is generally accepted by the empirical research that the factors that 
influence the capital structure of banks are not so different from the ones that influence firms in 
general. However, a distinct feature and a common perception in the literature on banking, is that 
banks are highly leveraged firms.   
There is no doubt that capital structure theories may contribute towards explaining the decisions 
on the banking capital structure, but the role of leverage and its relationship with bank governance 
and the characteristics of managers, constitutes a topic that deserves further development. A first 
contribution of our study is towards the literature on corporate governance in banking. Our paper 
focuses on the banking sector and, therefore, we provide empirical evidence on the significance of 
managers’ characteristics to corporate strategic decisions in banking.  The focus on this particular 
sector, allows us to validate our findings on homogenous firms, and by doing so we complement the 
literature on capital structure decisions in banking. 
Despite the literature that reports that individual managers matter for firm behaviour and their 
choices of policies (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Custódio and Metzger, 2014; Graham et al., 
2013; Malmendier and Tate, 2005 and 2008; Malmendier et al., 2011), the studies in the banking 
sector are very scarce. For instance, Nguyen et al. (2015) consider observable characteristics and 
those regarding experience, such as age, education and employment history and they explore the 
relation between executive characteristics and the market performance of banks. Berger et al. (2014) 
seek to understand how the manager’s team composition in terms of age, gender and education affect 
portfolio risk. In this paper, we intend to fill the gap in the literature using data for the Euro Area 
banking industry, focusing on how demographic and managers’ personal characteristics affect their 
leverage choices in this particular industry, considering also the influence of the management team 
on that choice. 
A second contribution of our study is to combine insights from the upper echelons’ perspective, 
with traditional theories in the explanation of the relation between managers and corporate capital 
structure decisions. Recent papers have identified that managers’ characteristics are determinant for 
corporate strategic decisions, thus it is well recognized that behavioural finance may contribute for a 
better explanation of the capital structure decisions (Cronkvist et al., 2012; Hackbarth, 2008; 
Subrahmanyam, 2007). For instance, Malmendier et al. (2011) consider in their study the role of 
managerial traits in explaining the variation in capital structure that is not explained by traditional 
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theories based on firm-, industry- and market-level explanations. Their purpose is to identify specific 
managerial characteristics, establishing a link between those characteristics and financial decisions 
and quantifying their effects.  
In the spirit of Cronqvist et al. (2012), together with the purpose of understanding the 
determinants of capital structure, our motivation relies on the attempt to show that managerial 
preferences may influence the firm’s strategic decisions, namely leverage levels decisions. Moreover, 
we aim to provide empirical evidence towards the development of the limited research that establishes 
a relation between manager personal characteristics and financial leverage decisions in banking. 
Considering that managers’ risk preference or perception may influence the leverage decision process, 
we investigate if the level of leverage at the manager´s appointment date is determinant for the 
leverage decision, as we may think that managers’ preferences in terms of risk may be determinant 
for their preferences in terms of leverage. 
Finally, we consider that in the presence of moral hazard the self-interest behaviour of managers 
is reflected in their leverage choices, thus time horizon may be a relevant characteristic to be included. 
We are aware that the inclusion of the myopic behaviour, bearing in mind the employment contract, 
time horizon or even contract length, has been made in order to assess the significance of an 
opportunistic behaviour or its effects on performance, investment or innovation (see, for instance, 
Antia et al., 2010; Gonzalez-Uribe and Xu, M, 2017; Xu, 2009, 2011; Xu and Cziraki, 2014), however 
it would also be interesting to consider its effects on leverage levels.  
In this sense, we may consider that managers will be more prone to short-term results in order 
to maximize their preferences when they face a short time horizon. To supplement prior research, this 
study uses contract time horizon that is measured by the time remaining (to the manager) until the 
end of the contract. However, as managers are not alone in the decision process, we consider the 
average contract time horizon for the management team. In this paper, we consider the possibility 
that horizon problems may be related with the management team’s horizon as managers with shorter 
decision horizons will prefer higher levels of leverage. 
The present study uses data that matches information from European banks and managers. We 
start from a cross sectional regression specification, however as we assume that the effect of the 
explanatory variables may differ at different points of the conditional distribution, we implement a 
simultaneous quantile regression model. This is of particular interest, as the quantile regressions 
confirm the existence of non-linearities. Our general findings suggest that younger and tenured 
managers, as well as managers with more experience, will be more predisposed to higher levels of 
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leverage. The effect of tenure differs according to the level of leverage at the manager’s appointment 
date and the positive relation between experience and leverage is only observed for highly leveraged 
banks. We have also observed that a bank’s leverage at the manager’s appointment date is 
determinant for the bank’s current leverage. In addition, we offer some insights regarding the inclusion 
of the horizon dimension, in a way that it considers that horizon problems may also be related with 
the management team’s horizon. In this sense, this study shed some light on whether and how the 
management team’s contract time horizon may influence the leverage decision process and how a 
short-time managerial horizon may reflect on the capital structure. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical and 
empirical evidence. Section 3 develops hypothesis concerning the relation between manager’s 
characteristics and leverage. Section 4 introduces our dataset, presenting some descriptive statistics 
and the definition of the variables used. This section is followed by the discussion of our empirical 
methodology. The empirical analysis is presented in Section 6 and some additional results and 
robustness tests are presented in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
The agency problem in banks pushes them towards more leverage and this may be explained by the 
opacity that is inherent to their assets, that hinders the way in which managers can be monitored by 
outsiders, thus creating a favourable environment for asset substitution (Gropp and Heider, 2010). 
Moreover, Gropp and Heider (2010) argue that factors related to individuals, may influence 
capital structure decisions and mention the research of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) that distinguish 
firm fixed effects, from manager fixed effects, following managers across different firms. Their study 
considers that capital structure depends on the managers’ preferences, thus differences in capital 
structure may be related to differences in the quality of the corporate governance. The same line of 
reasoning is also present in other studies that consider managers as key elements for understanding 
corporate leverage, namely Baker and Wurgler (2013), Frank and Goyal (2007) and Cadenillas et al. 
(2004). 
In their study, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) consider that managers are characterized by their 
own styles and this will have implications on the strategic decisions and corporate practices of the 
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firms they manage. In this sense, it may be of interest to understand manager characteristics and how 
those characteristics may explain the financing decision. 
Besides the idea that the inclusion of manager fixed effects may contribute to the increase of the 
explanatory power of the leverage regression and that fixed effects may reflect managerial behaviour, 
Frank and Goyal (2007) also consider that  the managers’ observable characteristics like age, 
educational background and employment histories may explain their behaviour and consequently their 
choices, thus the managers’ observable characteristics, may be associated with different leverage 
levels. For instance, they observe that a longer tenure is related with a lower leverage and that 
managers holding an MBA or a law degree, or managers who have previously worked at more 
companies, tend to present a higher leverage. 
Several researchers have questioned how similar firms may differ in their corporate decisions. In 
this sense, it has been recognized that the distinctive features inherent to the managers may explain 
those differences and the way in which managers may influence leverage decisions. The assertion 
that corporate decisions reflect the managerial background traits and characteristics, originally 
presented in Hambrick and Mason (1984) in their Upper-echelon theory, is in accordance with the 
idea that managers’ characteristics such as age, tenure, educational background and career 
experiences affect their corporate strategic decisions. The theory suggests that the more complex a 
decision, the more important are the personal characteristics of the decision makers. In this sense, 
the inclusion of managers’ characteristics in studying the determinants of a firm’s capital structure 
has gained attention. 
This line of reasoning draws from behavioural finance research as it considers that decisions do 
not only depend on the firm’s environment, but also on the manager’s personal characteristics in the 
way proposed by Hambrick and Mason (1984). Figure 1 explains how upper echelon characteristics 
explain strategic choices, assuming that the environment is not enough to explain the actions and 
outcomes of organizations. 
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Figure 1: An Upper Echelon Perspective of Organizations 
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Several behavioural finance studies have focused their attention on the characteristics of 
managers, bearing in mind that managers are central to the organizations, as they influence a firm’s 
policy choices (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Custódio and Metzger, 2014; Escribá-Esteve et al., 2009; 
Graham and Harvey, 2001; Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Malmendier et al., 2011; 
Matemilola et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2015). In this sense, recent empirical studies suggest that 
CEO characteristics matter, and evidence on manager’s heterogeneity includes demographic 
characteristics such as age, gender, tenure, education and experience (Berger et al., 1997; Bertrand 
and Schoar, 2003; Chen et al., 2010; Custódio and Metzger, 2015; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hu 
and Liu, 2015; Ryan and Wang, 2012), while personal traits such as overconfidence, personal risk 
attitudes or preferences are included (Cronqvist et al., 2012; Graham et al., 2013; Malmendier and 
Tate, 2005, 2008; Malmendier et al., 2011). 
In addition to the empirical literature presented in this paper, it is worth mentioning some 
theoretical research such as Cadenillas et al. (2004) who develop a theoretical model in which they 
consider the relation between managerial risk aversion and leverage. Their results are in line with 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003), who demonstrate that the type of manager and, hence, the observable 
manager characteristics are associated with financing decisions, concluding that older managers are 
more conservative in their leverage decisions and that managers holding an MBA are less conservative. 
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Similarly, Hackbarth (2008) considers managerial characteristics in order to examine the relation 
between managerial traits, such as growth and risk perception biases, and the firm´s capital structure. 
His model shows that managers with growth and/or risk perception biases tend to choose higher 
leverage levels in comparison to unbiased managers.  
The theoretical research presented also considers the presence of agency costs. As pointed out 
by Kuo and Wang (2015), and in line with the agency theory proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
the self-interested behaviour of a manager is reflected in corporate capital structure decisions. This 
behaviour may be more prevalent in the presence of moral hazard, where managers are more prone 
to short-term results in order to maximize their preferences.  
On the other hand, Hackbarth (2008) considers the interaction between agency problems and 
managerial traits, such as growth and risk perception biases. Managers with growth perception bias 
will overestimate the growth of future earnings and managers with risk perception bias believe that 
the firm is less risky than it actually is, thus in both cases the likelihood of financial distress is 
underestimated.  This biasedness can help to reduce the principal-agent problem, in the sense that 
higher debt levels will constrain the availability of funds, thus managers will enhance firm value. More 
specifically, according to Hackbarth (2008), the need to balance the benefits of tax benefits, default 
costs, and self-interest with the need to ensure sufficient efficiency to avoid being replaced, will 
constrain self-interested managers. However, this value-enhancing behaviour is not evident for the 
case where extreme managerial biases are observed. 
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3. Hypothesis development 
As mentioned above, managers’ characteristics may be influential in the leverage decision process. 
In this section we develop hypothesis concerning those characteristics, which are: (1) age (2) gender 
(3) tenure (4) experience and (5) leverage at the appointment date. 
 
Age 
In line with the upper echelon theory, age may influence leverage decision as older managers are 
more risk averse and more conservative than younger managers. This conservative attitude is stated 
by Hambrick and Mason (1984) who posit three reasons why older managers are apparently more 
conservative. First, older managers may have less mental and physical stamina or may be less able 
to grasp new ideas and learn new behaviours. Moreover, as the ability to assimilate information 
diminishes as managers get older, age may be positively related with seeking information behaviour, 
in order to more accurately assess information and by doing so the decision-making process takes 
longer. Second, older managers may have a greater commitment to the organizational status quo. 
Lastly, older managers are at a stage in their lives, where financial and career stability are more 
important. In this sense, the managers’ preference for a quiet life, increases with age (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2003). Moreover, as Hu and Liu (2015) refer, the costs of failure are more evident to 
older managers, as they have more difficulty in getting a new job. 
Serfling (2014) suggests that the way a manager’s age impacts risk-taking behaviour may be not 
so consistent. In fact, if career concerns dominate there should be a positive relation between age and 
risk-taking. However, in a managerial signalling model, younger managers attempt to signal to the 
market that they are talented managers, pursuing riskier and more aggressive investment strategies. 
In this case, a negative relation between age and risk-taking, may be expected.  
H1: Manager’s age is negatively related with leverage. 
 
Gender 
Another widely used variable that describes the characteristics of a manager is gender. There is a 
growing literature that recognizes that gender is determinant for corporate choices and considers, 
among others, differences in risk aversion, overconfidence or in unemployment risk, as referred in 
Faccio et al. (2016). As men tend to be more confident, comparatively to women, it may also be 
expected that they will be more prone to riskier strategies and to higher levels of debt (Graham et al., 
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2013). This is in line with Chen et al. (2014), who state that firms with male managers give rise to a 
higher possibility of using debt. Faccio et al. (2016) refer that firms managed by females present lower 
leverage, less volatile earnings and a higher chance of survival, than firms managed by males. 
H2: Manager’s (male) gender is positively related to leverage. 
 
Tenure 
Tenure also plays an important role in decision making, particularly in the Upper Echelon Theory 
perspective. Hu and Liu (2015) consider that managers with a longer tenure have less need to 
establish a reputation, thus becoming more risk averse. As tenure increases, managers are more 
confident that they will not be replaced, and they will be less receptive to new ideas and changes 
(Orens and Reheul, 2013). Moreover, a longer tenure will contribute to the increase of the discretionary 
power of managers. This point of view is in accordance with the human capital hypothesis presented 
in Chen and Zheng’s (2014) work, where longer tenure may suggest a greater managerial power and 
entrenchment. Therefore, in the same line of reasoning, as presented in Berger et al. (1997) and Ryan 
and Wiggins (2001), entrenched managers are risk averse, in order to protect their private benefits, 
thus firm leverage is affected by a manager’s entrenchment and managers tend to avoid debt. 
H3: Tenure is negatively related to leverage. 
 
Experience 
Experience may influence the decision-making processes, in which individuals are involved. In line 
with Matemilola (2013) and Escribá-Esteve et al. (2009) experience may reflect a manager’s cognitive 
ability, thus managers with more experience would be more capable in a complex decision process, 
as they have the cognitive ability to make high quality decisions in this type of environment. Moreover, 
experienced managers are more able to analyse the expected risk and outcome of their strategic 
choices (Matemilola, 2013). In the same line of reasoning, Ting et al. (2015) analyse the relation 
between managers’ previous experience and a firm’s financial policies, considering that top manager’s 
expertise and background is determinant for leverage decisions at the firm level. 
Escribá-Esteve et al. (2009) consider that the manager’s previous experience, accumulated by 
working in other firms or industries, will contribute to better and innovative ideas, which stimulate 
more proactive strategic decisions. We may consider here, as Custódio et al. (2013) and Hu and Liu 
(2015) that managers who worked for multiple firms have probably acquired more generic skills, in 
this sense, work experience will contribute towards gathering skills that will be determinant in the 
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strategic decision-making process.  In addition, a more diverse career experience will make managers 
more prone to exploit external financing (Hu and Liu, 2015).  
Furthermore, a manager’s previous experience may be more relevant in the case of financial 
managers. Custódio and Metzger (2014) consider the relation between a firm’s financial policy and 
the financial expertise of the CEO, and they have observed that financial expert CEOs have a more 
diverse work experience, than nonfinancial experts; moreover, they have concluded that financial 
experts have more general managerial skills. Their results conclude that a manager’s previous work 
experience, affects a firm’s financial policies. 
Finally, as Nguyen et al. (2015) suggest, more experienced managers may bring their social ties 
and networks to the banks, therefore a more diverse career experience may help to accumulate social 
connections, and by doing so managers will have quicker and better access to information, mitigating 
information asymmetry and contributing to the search for new business opportunities (Hu and Liu, 
2015; Ting et al., 2015). 
Looking at this relation, Hu and Liu (2015) find that more experienced managers are more likely 
to use debt financing, however, when considering that this effect may vary according to the firm’s 
financial constraint, the findings suggest that the positive relationship between manager experience 
and debt financing is only observable for constrained firms. 
H4: Experience is positively related to leverage. 
 
Leverage at the appointment date 
Considering that a manager’s risk preference may influence the leverage decision process, risk-averse 
managers will prefer a low leverage and to hold more cash, in order to avoid financial pressure. In line 
with Cain and McKeon (2016), the manager’s utility is affected by changes in firm risk, thus the risk-
averse managers will see their utility affected negatively by the increase in firm risk. 
Because banks with higher leverage will incur in higher risk, the level of leverage at the 
appointment date may be determinant for the leverage decision process since, for instance, if 
managers are risk averse that would give rise to a higher possibility of employing a low leverage level. 
However, for risk-preference managers the possibility of increasing leverage will be higher (Chen et 
al., 2014; Graham et al., 2013) 
In addition, we may also consider, in line with the model proposed by Hackbarth (2008), that 
managers with risk perception bias believe the firm is less risky than it actually is, and they tend to 
choose higher levels of debt. Based on this idea, it is expected, especially for banks with excessive 
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leverage, that for this type of managers the current level of leverage may be higher in comparison to 
the appointment date. 
H5: Leverage at the appointment date has an uncertain effect on leverage. 
4. Data, sample and variables definition 
4.1. Data and Sample 
We use a previous prepared dataset on all banks from 19 countries that are members of the Euro 
Area with data for the 1987-2015 period. Information from income statements and balance sheet 
information on individual banks is taken from Bankscope. The Bankscope database, provided by 
Bureau van Dijk, is a unique collection of micro-level banking information for different countries. It 
comprises information on detailed financials, which are presented in multiple formats, including the 
universal format to compare banks globally. All data is reported in Euros and adjusted by price 
consumer index inflation in each respective country.  
Data for managers4 is also provided and it includes, for instance, address, contact numbers and 
web address, specialisation, various identification codes and managers’ details. To derive the final 
sample, data on managers in 2015 was collected from Bankscope and matched with the original bank 
dataset. At the time of the data collection it was not possible to improve the information obtained or 
to increase the years of analysis, as the dataset was no longer available by the end of 2016. As the 
information on managers was only obtained for one year, we have applied a cross-section regression 
analysis.  
The original database included 61,585 observations, with information on 3,461 banks and 
56,761 managers. After checking and clearing for inconsistencies and dropping all banks that are 
categorized as “Central banks", “Specialized governmental credit institutions” and “Multi-lateral 
governmental banks”, we have ended up with 58,908 observations, representing 3,362 banks and 
54,303 managers.  
The summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis are presented in Table 1. Besides 
mean, standard deviation maximum and minimum, Table 1 provides the value of those variables at 
different quantiles. We observe that some variables show high dispersion, which may be a concern as 
OLS estimations may be more affected by these outliers. The presence of outliers is particularly 
                                                 
4 Bankscope considers managers as well as directors, thus reporting “Directors/Managers”. 
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relevant for the variable experience, total assets and growth of total assets.  In order to account for 
this potential problem in our OLS specification, the explanatory variables were trimmed at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. Table 1 presents information regarding the original sample and the trimmed sample. 
The mean and median age for managers is 55 and 54 years, respectively. Average tenure is 5 years 
while the median tenure is 4 years and about 78% are male managers. The level of leverage at the 
appointment date is nearly 91% in average, with a median of 93% and the management team has, on 
average, almost two years until the resignation date. 
As referred above, there are some differences among the summary statistics, which is the case 
for the variable experience that presents an average of 2.52 for the original dataset and 1.25 for the 
trimmed dataset. With respect to total assets and growth of total assets, they present an average of 
126,000 million euros and 3.54%, respectively. For the trimmed sample, the average of these 
variables is almost 98,000 million euros and 2.85%, respectively. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Original Dataset 
Variable N Mean St. Dev Min. Max. 
1st 
percentile 
5th 
percentile 
10th 
percentile 
25st 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75st 
percentile 
90th 
percentile 
95st 
percentile 
99th 
percentile 
Liabilities to total assets (%) 56,381 88.82 14.22 0.00 350.62 12.97 63.30 84.46 89.36 91.82 94.65 95.49 96.54 99.02 
Age (years) 36,441 54.59 9.65 22.00 99.00 34.00 39.00 42.00 48.00 54.00 60.00 66.00 70.00 83.00 
Gender (1=male;0=female) 56,458 0.78 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Tenure (years) 32,243 5.23 6.07 0.00 59.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4.00 6.00 12.00 17.00 34.00 
Experience (# of firms) 58,908 2.52 14.48 1.00 181.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 14.00 
Leverage at the appointment date (%) 22,632 90.52 13.09 0.51 627.11 17.11 75.25 86.18 90.64 93.41 95.49 96.64 97.49 98.82 
Management team’s horizon (years) 3,909 2.00 0.63 1.00 7.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.83 3.20 4.00 
Tenure Lag (years) 32,243 -0.04 3.92 -28.05 49.79 -9.35 -5.74 -4.06 -2.01 0.00 2.00 4.33 3.20 11.73 
Net income to total assets - ROA (%) 30,418 0.48 1.17 -37.53 44.32 -1.73 -0.14 0.02 0.23 0.48 0.56 1.03 1.64 3.97 
Total assets 56,562 1.26e+08 4.27e+08 27.00 7.88e+09 23,951 94,435 175,102 625,798 2,985,555 2.93e+07 3.90e+08 6.70e+08 1.33e+09 
Growth of total assets (%) 56,992 3.54 20.37 -99.42 418.57 -33.54 -14.72 -7.33 -0.53 1.96 5.63 11.79 19.82 73.08 
Tangibility 55,531 0.01 0.07 0.00 2.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.11 
Trimmed dataset 
Liabilities to total assets (%) 56,381 88.82 14.22 0.00 350.62 12.97 63.30 84.46 89.36 91.82 94.65 95.49 96.54 99.02 
Age (years) 35,815 54.45 8.87 34.00 83.00 36.00 40.00 43.00 48.00 54.00 60.00 66.00 69.00 77.00 
Gender (1=male;0=female) 56,458 0.78 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Tenure (years) 32,230 5.21 6.02 0.00 34.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4.00 6.00 12.00 17.00 34.00 
Experience (# of firms) 58,347 1.25 0.99 1.00 14.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 
Leverage at the appointment date (%) 22,188 91.21 9.52 17.11 98.82 38.66 78.90 86.50 90.75 93.41 95.49 96.54 97.18 98.54 
Management team’s horizon (years) 3,883 1.98 0.58 1 4.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.53 3.00 4.00 
Tenure lag (years) 31,602 -0.05 3.31 -9.35 11.73 -7.63 -5.40 -4.01 -2.01 0.00 0.99 4.00 5.95 10.00 
Net income to total assets - ROA (%) 29,823 0.48 0.56 -1.68 3.97 -1.10 -0.09 0.02 0.23 0.48 0.56 1.00 1.47 2.67 
Total assets 55,437 9.75e+07 2.13e+08 23,951 1.33e+09 43,994.90 107,513 187,100 633,117 2,985,555 2.80e+07 3.90e+08 5.32e+08 8.42e+08 
Growth of total assets (%) 55,734 2.85 10.36 -33.08 73.08 -21.92 -12.38 -6.36 -0.43 1.96 5.63 11.29 17.81 46.71 
Tangibility 55,944 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 
Source: Computations from the author based on Bankscope (2015) and Orbis Bank Focus (2016). 
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4.2. Variables 
In this subsection, we describe the main variables used in the empirical analysis. The detailed 
definition of the variables is summarized in Table A.1, from Appendix. 
The dependent variable in this study is liabilities to total assets, measured as total liabilities, 
divided by total assets. This ratio examines how much of a bank’s assets are made of liabilities. 
Manager characteristics like age and gender may influence a manager’s behaviour. These 
characteristics are observed and directly obtained from the dataset. Tenure is measured as the length 
of time between the date when the manager started the position in the bank (appointment date) and 
the current year 2015 (current date).  
Work experience contributes towards gathering skills that are determinant for making strategic 
decisions; we consider the variable experience as the number of firms for which the manager is 
working for. We consider, in line with Hu and Liu (2015), that diverse career experiences help to 
accumulate social connections, thus it may also be related with the manager’s network. 
The variable leverage at the appointment date is obtained from a preliminary dataset that provides 
information on banks. We used this dataset to obtain previous year values for some bank variables 
and matched them with the dataset on managers. By doing this, it was possible to assign to each 
manager the existing level of leverage on his/her appointment date. The usefulness of this variable is 
to evaluate if the bank’s leverage at the appointment date has a significant effect on the bank’s current 
leverage. 
Furthermore, we consider some bank-specific factors that are well established in the capital 
structure literature (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goal, 2009; and Gropp and Heider, 2010), 
such as bank profitability, size, growth and tangibility.  
Profitability (roa) is measured as the return on average assets. The relation between profitability 
and leverage may be uncertain. In this sense, a negative effect may be expected, as profitable banks 
tend to hold more capital since they face a lower cost of increasing equity in the short term, thus, in 
line with Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goal (2009), if debt financing is the dominant 
source of external financing, then more profitable firms will have less leverage. However, profitability 
may also be positively related with leverage, as profitable firms may seek tax benefits, or since they 
face lower expected costs of financial distress, they are more prone to use more debt (Frank and Goal, 
2009). 
The variable size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets and its inclusion is justified 
by the fact that large and diversified firms face lower probability of financial distress. This variable may 
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also reflect the bank’s reputation in debt markets, as well as their superior debt market access with 
preferable lending conditions, thus it is expected that for larger banks it will be easier to issue more 
debt. 
High growth firms have higher costs of financial distress, free cash problems and debt-related 
agency problems (Frank and Goal, 2009), thus in accordance with the trade-off theory, high growth 
firms are more equity financed and therefore growth reduces leverage. However, it is also considered 
under the pecking order theory, that firms with growth opportunities – holding profitability fixed – will 
issue more debt, thus leverage and growth opportunities are positively related. As a measure for 
growth opportunities, we use the growth of total assets. 
The literature also finds a positive association between tangible assets and leverage, thus the 
variable tangibility is also included. As referred by Rajan and Zingales (1995), tangible assets are easy 
to collateralize and thus reduce the agency costs related to debt. Notwithstanding this positive relation, 
Frank and Goal (2009) consider that, under the pecking order theory, the predictions are ambiguous 
as low information asymmetry, associated with tangible assets, makes equity less costly, thus leverage 
is negatively related with tangibility. However, if adverse selection is about assets in place, tangibility 
increases adverse selection and firms will incur in higher debt.  
5. Empirical methodology 
For the estimation of the relationship between leverage and manager characteristics, we depart from 
a cross sectional regression where the model is formulated as a linear specification for the conditional 
mean of the dependent variable. We estimate the conditional mean regression as 
𝐸(𝐿𝑖,𝑐|𝑋𝑖,𝑐) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖𝑐 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑐 + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝛿𝑏                                                  (1) 
where 𝐿𝑖,𝑐 represents the ratio of liabilities to total assets of the bank’s manager i in country c. 
We include some bank-specific factors that are well established determinants of leverage, as well as 
variables related to manager characteristics. These variables are described in detail in the previous 
section. We have also included country and bank specialization dummies, 𝜇𝑐 + 𝛿𝑏 , respectively. 
We start from the simplest specification that provides estimates based on the average effect of 
the independent variables on the conditional mean of leverage, however standard least squares 
regression techniques provide an incomplete view of the relationship, as they fail in considering other 
locations of the leverage distribution. While the optimal properties of standard regression estimators 
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are not robust to modest departures from normality, quantile regression results are characteristically 
robust to outliers and heavy tailed distributions.  
In our case, a quantile regression model may be preferable, as it allows us to estimate the effects 
of the explanatory variables at different points in the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. 
By relaxing the assumption that errors terms are identically distributed at all points of the conditional 
distribution and considering that slope parameters vary at different quantiles, it may be more reliable 
as we may obtain a more complete understanding of the relationship, and how it may vary throughout 
the leverage distribution. For applications on quantile regressions analysis in capital structure studies 
see, for instance, Fattouh et al. (2005, 2008), Margaritis and Psillaki (2007) and Sánchez-Vidal 
(2014). 
The quantile regression model is defined as 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝜃(𝐿𝑖|𝑋𝑖) = 𝛼𝜃 + 𝛽𝜃1𝑥1𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝜃𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖 + 𝜇𝜃𝑐 + 𝛿𝜃𝑏                                      (2) 
where 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝜃(𝐿𝑖|𝑋𝑖) denotes the 𝜃
𝑡ℎ conditional quantile of 𝐿𝑖 given 𝑋𝑖.  
As described by Koenker and Basset (1978), the 𝜃𝑡ℎ regression quantile, 0 < 𝜃 < 1, solves the 
following problem 
min
𝛽
1
𝑛
{∑ 𝜃|𝑦𝑖𝑐 − 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑐𝛽| +𝑖,𝑐:𝑦𝑖𝑐≥𝑥′𝑖𝑐𝛽 ∑ 1 − 𝜃|𝑦𝑖𝑐 − 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑐𝛽|𝑖,𝑐:𝑦𝑖𝑐<𝑥′𝑖𝑐𝛽 } =
min
𝛽
1
𝑛
 ∑ 𝜌𝜃𝜇𝜃𝑖𝑐
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                                                                            (3) 
where 𝜌𝜃(𝑢) is the “check function” defined as 
 𝜌𝜃(𝑢) = {
 𝜃𝑢             𝑖𝑓 𝑢 ≥ 0
 (𝜃 − 1)    𝑖𝑓 𝑢 < 0
                                                                                   (4) 
The resulting minimization problem in Equation (3) can be solved by linear programming methods 
(Koenker and Basset, 1978). 
Due to the advantages of quantile regression estimates over standard least squares regression 
technique, we consider the conditional quantile regression to model the relationship between leverage 
and the explanatory variables conditional on the selected quantiles. Thus, quantile regression allows 
us to assess the association of the predictors, with leverage at different points of the conditional 
leverage distribution. The quantile 𝜃 ∈ (0,1) is that 𝐿, which splits the data into proportions 𝜃 below 
and 1 − 𝜃 above. As 𝜃 can be specified as any value between 0 and 1, the estimated coefficients 
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may differ, depending on the particular quantile being estimated.  For our analysis, we estimate 
quantile functions at both tails of the leverage distribution – 𝜃(0.10) and 𝜃(0.90) –, the median 
regression – 𝜃(0.50) – and interquartile regression – 𝜃(0.25) and 𝜃(0.75). 
As pointed out by Yang et al. (2012), based on Koenker and Hallock (2001), the interpretation of 
quantile regression estimation is similar to, but slightly different from, that of ordinary least squares. 
The standard linear regression summarizes the average relationship between a set of predictors and 
the dependent variable based on the conditional mean function, thus the coefficient of the specified 
predictor, X, represents the expected change in the dependent variable that is associated with a unit 
change in X. For the quantile regression, the coefficient X in the 𝜃𝑡ℎ quantile can be interpreted as 
the marginal change (relative to the value of the 𝜃𝑡ℎ quantile of the dependent variable), due to a one 
unit change in X.  As a result, the interpretation of quantile regression results needs to specify which 
quantile of the dependent variable they refer to. 
We implement simultaneous quantile regression instead of quantile regression, as it estimates 
each equation simultaneously and obtains an estimate of the entire variance-covariance matrix of the 
estimators by bootstrapping.  As it produces several values of 𝜃 simultaneously, it allows testing for 
differences between quantile regressions coefficients for different quantiles5 across the quantiles of 
leverage, to further confirm the pattern in the relation between leverage and manager characteristics, 
namely contract time horizon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 For the implementation of this procedure we have used the “sqreg” command in Stata 14 and required the model to perform 100 bootstrap replications.  
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6. Empirical analysis 
6.1. Baseline results 
To test the impact of manager characteristics on leverage, we use the following general cross-sectional 
regression specification: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 
                      + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑖  + 
                              + 𝛽7𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 
                              + 𝛽9𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 +  
                                  + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑐 + 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑏 + 𝜇𝑖                                              (5)               
where  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑐  is the ratio of liabilities to total assets of the manager´s bank. For manager 
characteristics we consider 𝐴𝑔𝑒 and 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟. Gender represents a dummy variable taking value one 
if male. We also consider 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒  as the number of years between current date (2015) and 
resignation date. 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 measures the number of banks for which manager works. A bank’s 
leverage at the manager’s appointment date is represented by leverage at the appointment date. 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑔 measures the distance in years between a management team’s tenure and a manager’s 
tenure. We have also included the interaction of the 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒  variable, with 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒. 𝑅𝑂𝐴 is the return on assets; 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets; 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  is computed as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. To 
measure 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 , we use annual percentage change of total assets. As already 
mentioned we have also included country and bank specialization dummies. 
Table 2 presents the estimation results from the baseline specification of equation (1). As 
previously mentioned, we have included variables related with manager characteristics, as well as 
some bank determinants of leverage.  
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Table 2: Ordinary Least Square regressions of liabilities to total assets 
Dependent variable: Liabilities to total assets 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.016*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Male 0.141 0.137 -0.037 -0.035 -0.020 
 (0.136) (0.136) (0.063) (0.064) (0.061) 
Tenure 0.019** 0.019** -0.000 0.050** 3.253*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.024) (0.532) 
Experience  0.061 0.315*** 0.321*** 0.285*** 
  (0.077) (0.071) (0.072) (0.069) 
Leverage at the appointment date   0.497*** 0.496*** 0.649*** 
   (0.034) (0.034) (0.044) 
Tenure Lag    -0.061*** -0.027 
    (0.024) (0.019) 
Tenure*Leverage at the appointment date     -0.035*** 
     (0.006) 
Return on assets -283.947*** -285.051*** -160.638*** -163.095*** -151.023*** 
 (16.388) (16.397) (9.860) (10.017) (10.306) 
Size 1.277*** 1.277*** 0.526*** 0.534*** 0.487*** 
 (0.061) (0.060) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) 
Tangibility -78.797*** -78.870*** -64.100*** -65.233*** -60.045*** 
 (10.067) (10.100) (6.668) (6.758) (6.217) 
Growth opportunity 4.511*** 4.562*** 4.212*** 4.312*** 4.461*** 
 (0.715) (0.713) (0.559) (0.564) (0.530) 
Constant 72.872*** 72.797*** 38.124*** 37.659*** 24.650*** 
 (1.222) (1.241) (2.805) (2.800) (3.730) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank specialization dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,779 11,770 9,382 9,253 9,253 
R-squared 0.321 0.322 0.656 0.658 0.687 
RMSE 5.219 5.219 2.920 2.929 2.802 
F-stat 3802 3691 210.5 205.7 23963 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Source: Computation from the author. 
Notes:  (1) All  explanatory  variables  were  trimmed at  the 1st  and  99th percentiles.  (2) Robust standard errors in brackets.  
(3) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
Consistent with the literature, the OLS results suggest that profitability and tangibility are 
associated with a lower leverage, while size and growth opportunity, as expected, affect the bank’s 
leverage positively.  
The inclusion of variables related to managerial characteristics and personal traits suggests that 
younger managers are less risk averse and less conservative in their leverage decisions. This behaviour 
is acceptable as we may consider, besides other arguments, that older managers may prefer a quiet 
life and career stability (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Hu and Liu, 2015). Moreover, as suggested 
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by Serfling (2014) age may exert a negative effect on leverage, as younger managers may desire to 
signal that they are talented managers, by pursuing riskier and more aggressive strategic decisions. 
Despite the common perception that gender differences may be determinant for the choice of 
capital structure, and that firms managed by males present a higher use of debt, the results do not 
confirm this, as the variable gender is not statistically significant. As suggested by Faccio et al. (2016) 
managers present some specificities and special skills, therefore for top managers there may not be 
a difference between males and females; this may suggest the existence of a self-selection 
mechanism, as women who choose to be managers are considerably different from all the rest.  
Controlling for some personal traits, namely tenure, the results depict a positive relationship 
between leverage and a manager’s tenure. In this case, we do not find empirical evidence that 
confirms a negative relationship between tenure and leverage. We may say that our findings are 
inconsistent with an entrenchment argument; however, they seem to be consistent with the idea 
presented in Korkeamäki et al. (2017) and based on Cronqvist et al. (2012), according to whom 
individual preferences towards financial risk, may be determinant to capital structure. Therefore, 
managers with a longer tenure will be more able to increase leverage, as they can bring their personal 
preferences. However, this effect differs according to the level of leverage at the manager’s 
appointment date, thus suggesting that a manager’s power is constrained. 
With regards to a manager’s experience, we observe a positive effect on leverage. Hence, as 
suggested by Escribá-Esteve et al. (2009), Custódio et al. (2013) and Hu and Liu (2015), the results 
suggest that a more diverse career experience will contribute towards enhancing a manager’s 
expertise and the gathering of skills that are determinant in strategic decision-making and this may 
explain why managers will be more prone to exploit external financing. Moreover, we may consider 
that the accumulated experience, will be accompanied by the creation of social ties and networks, 
thus managers will have quicker and better access to debt financing (Nguyen et al., 2015; Hu and 
Liu, 2015; Ting et al., 2015). Additionally, we may expect that managers that belong to several boards 
can reduce their personal risk exposure. 
The inclusion of leverage at the appointment date, confirms a statistically strong positive relation 
between the bank´s leverage at the manager’s appointment date and the current level of leverage. In 
this sense, the initial bank´s leverage that the manager will face when he/she starts the appointment, 
exerts influence on the leverage decision process in which the managers will take part. This may 
suggest that managers that are less risk-averse will prefer higher levels of leverage or, in the presence 
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of risk perception bias, like Hackbarth (2008) suggests, managers will choose higher levels of leverage 
assuming that banks are less risky than they really are. 
We observe that the inclusion, in our regression, of the variable leverage at the appointment date 
does not alter the expected sign and magnitude of the coefficients, the only exception is for the variable 
tenure, which for this specification turns insignificant. Considering that, as previously referred, the 
variable tenure may signal that managers with a longer tenure are more willing to imprint their leverage 
preferences in the leverage decisions in which they participate, and that managers that are less risk-
averse will prefer higher levels of leverage – something that was already discussed with the inclusion 
of the variable leverage at the appointment date –, we may consider, in line with Berger et al. (2014), 
that the effect of managers can be counterbalanced by other executives, thus we need to account for 
that constraint. We, therefore, consider the effect of tenure lag.  The results suggest a negative effect 
of the distance between a management team’s tenure and a manager’s tenure on leverage. The logic 
behind this may be explained by the fact that managers that present a higher lag in comparison with 
the bank’s management team, will be more constrained and, as suggested by Berger et al. (2014), in 
line with the ideas presented in Adams and Ferreira (2010), in the decision-making processes 
individuals tend to be riskier than groups, whose decisions will result in rejection of projects which are 
too risky.  
As previously observed, there is a positive relationship between leverage and a manager’s tenure, 
however, despite the influence of individual preferences towards financial risk on capital structure, this 
effect varies according with the bank’s risk exposure. In order to explore the tenure variable in more 
detail, we include its interaction with the leverage at the appointment date.  It is observed that the 
coefficient of leverage at the appointment date remains positive and the positive effect of the variable 
tenure increases in a considerable way; however, the interaction coefficient suggests a negative effect.  
Figure 2 depicts a clearer picture of this effect. For managers that observed a lower leverage at their 
appointment date, the effect of tenure on a bank’s leverage will be positive, however for managers 
whose banks present higher values of leverage at their appointment date, there is a negative effect of 
tenure on leverage, thus not rejecting the hypothesis of a negative relation between tenure and 
leverage, but only for higher values of leverage at the manager’s appointment date. This suggests that 
tenured managers may exert more influence on leverage, when their bank risk is lower, that is to say, 
for lower levels of leverage at the manager’s appointment date. 
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Figure 2: Average marginal effects of tenure on leverage 
 at different levels of leverage at the appointment date 
 
Source: Computation from the author. 
Notes: Average marginal effects calculated with a 95% confidence interval.  
6.2. Quantile regression results 
As already mentioned, the OLS, by focusing on the central tendency of the distribution, does not 
consider that the effect of the explanatory variables may differ at different points of the conditional 
distribution. Table 3 reports the results of estimating equation (2) for different values of 𝜃 using 
liabilities to total assets as the dependent variable. As previously reported, we estimate the coefficients 
at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th using the same list of explanatory variables. The conditional quantiles 
estimates reported in Table 3 show that we may expect different effects of the explanatory variables 
at the different quantiles of the distribution.  
As expected, profitability enters with a negative and significant coefficient, thus supporting the 
fact that an increase in internal funds is related with a decrease in leverage, therefore banks tend to 
hold more capital. Size also presents a positive and a significant coefficient that is higher for lower and 
moderate levels of leverage and decreases in magnitude for higher levels of leverage. As suggested, 
large banks may benefit from preferable lending conditions and better access to debt, however as 
banks become highly leveraged, they might not be able to borrow at preferable conditions. 
The tangibility coefficient, as reported by the OLS estimates, suggests a negative and significant 
effect. As previously discussed, the effect of this variable on leverage may be ambiguous. We may 
think, in line with Frank and Goal (2008), that for lower levels of leverage, the low information 
asymmetry associated with tangible assets makes equity less costly, however as banks become more 
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leveraged and if there is adverse selection about firm value, firms will prefer debt. Similarly, for growth 
opportunity, we observe a significant positive effect on leverage, which validates the idea that growing 
firms will issue more debt. 
Taking into consideration some manager’s characteristics as age, gender and tenure, we observe 
that, as reported in Table 2, age may exert a negative effect on leverage, however this effect is slightly 
more manifest for low values of leverage (10th quantile) and not significant for higher levels of leverage 
(90th quantile). This may confirm that younger managers may desire to signal that they are talented 
managers by pursuing riskier and more aggressive leverage choices, however this behaviour will be 
constrained as banks become more leveraged. It is observed that gender is not significant for any 
quantile. Finally, the results suggest that tenure is not significant for the 10th quantile, but it turns out 
to be significant for the other quantiles and its effect is increasing and becoming stronger, in 
comparison to our OLS estimates, as we move to higher levels of leverage. 
Focusing on the variables that attempt to assess the influence of a manager’s personal behaviour 
on leverage, we find that experience enters with a significant positive coefficient that is only observable 
for the highest quantile. This outcome confirms the relation between experience and leverage that was 
identified in our OLS specification, thus suggesting that experience, which is reflected by a manager’s 
expertise and his/her accumulated experience that increases social ties and networks, is central for 
high leverage banks, which require better access to debt financing. 
The results for our central measure of manager’s characteristics allows us to assess that the 
predicted linear effect is lower in comparison to what is observed for the OLS estimates. In fact, a 
significant and strong effect is observed, which suggests that a bank´s leverage level at the manager’s 
appointment date will be determinant for the level of leverage; however, a slightly lower but still clear 
effect for the 90th percentile is observed. Although this may signal that managers are more risk-prone, 
this effect may cease to be valid for higher levels of leverage, as firms get financial constraints. 
The negative effect of the interaction coefficient suggested on Table 2 remains. Moreover, the 
simultaneous quantile regressions not only show that this effect increases as we move up across 
quantiles, but they also indicate that for low quantiles (10th and 25th) the negative effect is not as strong 
as the one reported by the OLS estimates and for the intermediate and high quantiles (50th, 75th and 
90th) the effect is stronger. 
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Table 3: Simultaneous quantile regressions of liabilities to total assets 
Dependent variable: Liabilities to total assets 
Variable q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
Age -0.016*** -0.003* -0.006*** -0.005** -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Male -0.043 -0.015 -0.022 0.005 0.011 
 (0.040) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) (0.028) 
Tenure 0.636 2.379*** 5.172*** 6.710*** 6.146*** 
 (0.839) (0.486) (0.365) (0.633) (1.075) 
Experience -0.019 0.008 0.012 0.051 0.294** 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.018) (0.071) (0.129) 
Leverage at the appointment date 0.963*** 0.957*** 0.936*** 0.919*** 0.723*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.017) (0.089) 
Tenure Lag 0.008 -0.005 0.002 0.002 -0.028 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) 
Tenure*Leverage at the appointment date -0.009 -0.027*** -0.056*** -0.071*** -0.064*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) 
Return on assets -109.316*** -91.224*** -81.241*** -60.920*** -79.468*** 
 (8.617) (7.853) (8.148) (8.867) (20.348) 
Size 0.282*** 0.215*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.169*** 
 (0.032) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.047) 
Tangibility -23.917*** -12.082*** -11.338*** -6.449* -7.272*** 
 (8.211) (3.592) (4.341) (3.882) (2.068) 
Growth opportunity 0.686*** 0.506*** 0.799*** 0.398* 0.745*** 
 (0.098) (0.174) (0.202) (0.221) (0.289) 
Constant -1.912 -0.103 4.022*** 5.714*** 23.471*** 
 (1.740) (1.288) (0.844) (1.456) (7.636) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank specialization dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,041 10,041 10,041 10,041 10,041 
Source: Computation from the author. 
Notes: (1) Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. The bootstrap standard errors were obtained using 100 bootstrap 
replications. (2) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
The results presented in Table 3 are complemented by Figure 3 that depicts the estimated 
coefficients for the variables of interest. In order to verify statistical variation of coefficients along 
leverage conditional distribution, we plot the estimated coefficients of interest against the various 
quantiles and show the 95% confidence interval, constructed using the percentile method, with 100 
bootstrap replications. Figure 3 depicts the quantile regression coefficients that are presented as lines, 
varying across the quantiles, together with their confidence intervals. The OLS coefficients are plotted 
as a horizontal dashed line, with the confidence interval as two horizontal dashed lines around the 
coefficient line. 
It is clear that the effect of the explanatory variables on leverage is different at different quantiles 
of the distribution, so the OLS estimates gives us an incomplete picture as it does not allow for the 
possibility of non-linear effects. As can be seen, if the quantile coefficient is outside the OLS confidence 
interval, then we have significant differences between the quantile and the OLS estimates. For quantile 
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regression we need to distinguish between two types of significance, as quantile coefficients may be 
significantly different from zero, but quantile coefficients can also be significantly different from the 
OLS coefficients (outside the OLS confidence interval).  
Figure 3: Quantile regression coefficients and confidence intervals 
 
Source: Computation from the author. 
Notes: (1) quantile regression coefficients are presented as lines varying across the quantiles, together with their confidence 
intervals. The OLS coefficients are plotted as a horizontal dashed line, with the confidence interval as two horizontal dashed 
lines around the coefficient line. (2) Coefficients are plotted against the various quantiles and show the 95% confidence 
interval, constructed using the percentile method, with 100 bootstrap replications. (3) For the implementation of this 
procedure we have used the “sqreg” command in Stata 15. 
 
The simultaneous quantile regression allows us to obtain several values of 𝜃 simultaneously, 
allowing for differences between quantile regression’s coefficients to be tested. The bootstrap 
procedure is extended to construct a joint distribution that produces F-statistics to test for the equality 
of the estimated coefficients across different pairs of quantiles. The F-tests and the associated p-values 
presented on Table 4. According to the tests, the estimates clearly reject equality of coefficients 
between all pairs of quantiles, indicating that the impact of the explanatory variables differs across the 
distribution of leverage. 
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Table 4: F-tests for equality of coefficients across pairs of quantiles 
 10th 25th 50th 75th 
10th     
25th F-test=39.07    
 p-val=0.00    
50th F-test=113.49 F-test=84.86   
 p-val=0.00 p-val=0.00   
75th F-test=278.39 F-test=284.58 F-test=119.60  
 p-val=0.00 p-val=0.00 p-val=0.03  
90th F-test=185.01 F-test=162.35 F-test=76.52 F-test=21.33 
 p-val=0.00 p-val=0.00 p-val=0.00 p-val=0.00 
Source: Computation from the author. 
Notes: F-tests based on the bootstrap method with 100 bootstrap replications. 
7. Additional results and robustness checks 
In this section, we investigate whether the results are robust to alternative specifications. First, we use 
liabilities to total equity as an alternative definition for our dependent variable. Second, we examine if 
the results are confirmed when sub-sampling, excluding high leverage banks. We also include an 
additional explanatory variable that tries to account for the horizon of the management team.  
7.1. Alternative definition of the dependent variable 
To test the robustness of the results, we consider an alternative definition of the dependent variable, 
where leverage is measured as the ratio of liabilities to total equity. In Table 5, we regress the liabilities 
to total equity on the same set of explanatory variables as in Table 3. We observe that the expected 
signs obtained prevail, however, the variable tenure loses its significance at the 75th and 90th quantiles, 
and tangibility at the lower and median values of leverage. The most remarkable changes are the 
change of sign for the highest quantiles for the interaction variable, between tenure and leverage at 
the appointment date, although only significant at the 10% level; and that the variable tenure lag is 
now significant, except for the 10th quantile, and it changes its sign for the highest quantile. In spite of 
these changes, the results for other variables are similar and the main results prevail, namely, the 
positive effect of leverage at the appointment date. 
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Table 5: Simultaneous quantile regressions of liabilities to total equity  
(alternative dependent variable) 
Dependent variable: Liabilities to total equity 
Variable q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
Age -0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.017*** -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) 
Male -0.064 -0.131** 0.000 -0.006 0.005 
 (0.043) (0.063) (0.013) (0.050) (0.006) 
Tenure 0.662 2.506*** 2.519*** 1.250 -0.496 
 (0.489) (0.673) (0.676) (0.814) (0.442) 
Experience -0.054 0.020 0.069 0.109 0.261 
 (0.042) (0.049) (0.070) (0.221) (0.306) 
Leverage at the appointment date 0.500*** 0.588*** 0.501*** 0.437*** 0.109*** 
 (0.116) (0.106) (0.089) (0.090) (0.017) 
Tenure Lag 0.002 0.026*** 0.064*** 0.268*** -0.348*** 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.076) (0.034) 
Tenure*Leverage at the appointment date -0.008 -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.016* 0.009* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) 
Return on assets -102.872*** -117.796*** -113.788*** -190.925*** -209.265*** 
 (10.475) (10.307) (13.161) (35.241) (30.973) 
Size 1.008*** 0.949*** 0.864*** 0.855*** 1.096*** 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.064) (0.062) (0.091) 
Tangibility -1.989 -4.799 -9.065 -9.122* -13.574*** 
 (5.545) (3.906) (5.625) (5.006) (5.247) 
Growth opportunity 2.013*** 2.367*** 3.852*** 3.782*** 3.793*** 
 (0.207) (0.223) (0.656) (1.127) (0.492) 
Constant -52.966*** -59.106*** -49.903*** -40.557*** -10.830*** 
 (8.156) (7.876) (7.099) (7.727) (2.034) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank specialization dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,041 10,041 10,041 10,041 10,041 
Source: Computation from the author. 
Notes: (1) Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. The bootstrap standard errors were obtained using 100 bootstrap 
replications. (2) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
 
7.2. Sub-sampling 
As we presented in Section 2, one central element in banking corporate governance is the use of 
excessive leverage. In this sense, as excessive leverage has governance implications and 
encompasses agency problems that push banks towards more leverage, it may be the case that the 
results may be influenced by this behaviour. Therefore, we investigate whether the outcomes are 
confirmed, when we exclude banks with high leverage levels. 
We define high leverage banks as those that present values for liabilities to total assets above the 
median value of that variable (0.918249). This criterion reduces the sample from 10,041 observations 
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to 3,447 observations. We also use as a cut-off value of leverage the 75th percentile (0.9465431), 
which also reduces our sample to 7,082 observations. 
Table 6 presents the results for the estimations that exclude high leverage banks. We observe 
that the main results of Table 3 remain almost qualitatively the same. In general, the variables keep 
the same sign, except for the variable tenure lag that turns out to be significant and positive, but only 
marginally, for the highest quantile in sample (sample A); the same occurs in sample B for the 75th 
and 90th quantile, however it is observed that for low levels of leverage (10th quantile) there is a negative 
effect. We also observe that it is only significant in sample B for the 10th quantile. With respect to the 
variable leverage at the appointment date, the results depict a situation in which the variable keeps 
the same sign and almost the same effect as reported in Table 3. The only remarkable comment is 
that for high quantiles (90th) of both samples it is not so strong. 
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Table 6: Simultaneous quantile regressions of liabilities to total assets (high leverage banks excluded) 
Dependent variable: Liabilities to total assets Sample A – Banks above the median excluded Sample B – Banks above the 75th percentile excluded 
Variable q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
Age -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.016*** -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Male -0.029 -0.036 0.000 0.010 -0.000 -0.177** -0.011 -0.000 -0.000 0.014 
 (0.057) (0.051) (0.023) (0.035) (0.018) (0.078) (0.027) (0.011) (0.004) (0.016) 
Tenure 1.116 4.273*** 6.696*** 7.671*** 2.300* 0.717 2.993*** 5.218*** 6.649*** 2.629* 
 (1.032) (1.149) (0.949) (0.668) (1.276) (0.937) (0.522) (0.373) (0.503) (1.419) 
Experience -0.710 -0.131 -0.006 0.002 0.029 -0.120 -0.062 0.014 0.010 0.157 
 (0.476) (0.112) (0.014) (0.044) (0.106) (0.122) (0.054) (0.017) (0.023) (0.177) 
Leverage at the appointment date 0.978*** 1.006*** 0.916*** 0.792*** 0.239** 0.976*** 0.964*** 0.884*** 0.788*** 0.321*** 
 (0.011) (0.041) (0.023) (0.054) (0.115) (0.014) (0.023) (0.016) (0.042) (0.121) 
Tenure Lag -0.027 0.038 -0.019 -0.011 0.031* -0.021** 0.012 -0.000 0.021*** 0.030*** 
 (0.048) (0.039) (0.023) (0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Tenure*Leverage at the appointment date -0.016 -0.050*** -0.075*** -0.084*** -0.025* -0.011 -0.034*** -0.057*** -0.072*** -0.028* 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) 
Return on assets -111.737*** -65.111*** -46.835*** -28.626*** 10.229 -91.978*** -89.235*** -72.616*** -49.148*** -51.495*** 
 (13.396) (12.532) (6.910) (8.767) (10.537) (14.391) (7.479) (8.640) (7.539) (6.645) 
Size 0.842*** 0.267*** 0.126*** 0.103*** -0.027 0.240*** 0.191*** 0.121*** 0.030** 0.060** 
 (0.079) (0.060) (0.026) (0.027) (0.041) (0.045) (0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.028) 
Tangibility 0.649 -0.910 -0.036 -1.322** -2.379*** -9.900 -11.401*** -2.468 -4.860*** -6.186*** 
 (3.947) (3.434) (1.730) (0.551) (0.404) (11.312) (3.871) (3.095) (0.754) (0.889) 
Growth opportunity 8.780*** 6.372*** 4.413*** 2.382*** 0.667 3.754*** 2.987*** 2.442*** 2.319*** 1.822*** 
 (1.271) (1.019) (0.714) (0.672) (1.311) (0.540) (0.347) (0.310) (0.331) (0.287) 
Constant -16.654*** -10.209*** 4.392** 17.089*** 69.817*** -1.522 0.347 8.871*** 20.348*** 64.272*** 
 (2.058) (3.290) (2.130) (4.833) (11.004) (1.879) (2.148) (1.351) (3.801) (11.057) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank specialization dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,447 3,447 3,447 3,447 3,447 7,082 7,082 7,082 7,082 7,082 
Source: Computation from the author. 
Notes: (1) Sample A: high leverage banks are defined as those that present values for liabilities to total assets above the median value (0.918249). Sample B: high leverage banks are defined as those that 
present values for liabilities to total assets above the 75th percentile (0.9465431). (2) Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. The bootstrap standard errors were obtained using 100 bootstrap 
replications. (3) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
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7.3. Management team’s contract time horizon   
The management team’s contract time horizon may influence the leverage decision process, as 
managers with short time horizons may not make decisions that are in the firms’ best interest on a 
long-term basis. In line with Antia et al., (2010), Gonzalez-Uribe and Xu (2017), Xu (2009, 2011), and 
Xu and Cziraki (2014), who examine the relevance of the contract horizon and its relation to 
performance, investment and innovation, we consider that a short-term managerial horizon may harm 
firm value, enhancing the self-interested behaviour of the manager and its reflection on corporate 
capital structure decisions. 
Antia et al. (2010) documented that a shorter decision horizon is associated with significant 
agency costs, thus in accordance to Berger et al. (1997) we adopt the view that managers will prefer 
higher levels of leverage. For example, Cronqvist el al. (2009) and Berger et al. (1997) refer that 
leverage may be used as a bargaining tool to keep wages lower, which may signal, as Antia et al. 
(2010) suggest, that a short-term focus could boost short-term profits by cutting costs, however it is 
clearly not a value enhancing strategy.  In this sense, we may consider that managers will be more 
prone to short term results in order to maximize their preferences when they face a short time horizon. 
Thus, we expect that the management team’s contract time horizon is negatively related to leverage. 
The variable management team’s contract time horizon is computed as the difference between 
the resignation date and the current year 2015 (current date). From the dataset we obtain information 
about the resignation date of managers. Following Gonzalez-Uribe and Xu (2017), Xu (2009, 2011), 
and Xu and Cziraki (2014), we obtain the variable contract time horizon as the number of years 
remaining on the manager’s contract, but in our case, it will be computed as the average contract 
time horizon for each bank’s management team. The inclusion of this variable allows us to assess, for 
instance, if leverage increases in a short contract horizon or not and how a bank’s leverage behaves 
according to the positioning of the management team in their contract time horizon. 
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Table 7: Simultaneous quantile regressions of liabilities to total assets  
(additional explanatory variable – Management team’s contract time horizon) 
Dependent variable: Liabilities to total assets 
Variable q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Male 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.021) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
Tenure 6.703*** 6.556*** 5.142*** 0.683 -0.615 
 (0.854) (0.694) (1.937) (0.934) (0.896) 
Experience -0.350** -0.292* 0.000 0.209 0.190 
 (0.164) (0.169) (0.084) (0.132) (0.220) 
Leverage at the appointment date 0.760*** 0.757*** 0.592*** 0.224* 0.102 
 (0.048) (0.070) (0.219) (0.117) (0.126) 
Tenure Lag 0.205*** 0.115 0.104 0.109 0.053 
 (0.051) (0.080) (0.090) (0.092) (0.164) 
Tenure*Leverage at the appointment date -0.074*** -0.071*** -0.056*** -0.008 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.021) (0.010) (0.009) 
Management team’s horizon -0.713*** -0.755** -1.949** -3.549*** -3.011*** 
 (0.249) (0.368) (0.974) (0.754) (0.767) 
Return on assets -114.107*** -119.862*** -111.464*** -106.621*** -132.896*** 
 (10.782) (12.688) (11.431) (9.640) (22.541) 
Size 0.084 0.405** 0.403* 0.419*** 0.296** 
 (0.103) (0.160) (0.239) (0.130) (0.128) 
Tangibility -52.907*** -37.466*** 36.869 64.741 -22.958 
 (11.889) (12.605) (38.802) (40.976) (35.672) 
Growth opportunity 0.673** 0.327 2.184** 2.489** 1.091 
 (0.266) (0.585) (0.898) (1.028) (2.014) 
Constant 10.477 18.483* 34.697* 71.835*** 84.057*** 
 (8.658) (10.085) (18.931) (11.421) (12.649) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank specialization dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,004 
Source: Computation from the author. 
Notes: (1) Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. The bootstrap standard errors were obtained using 100 bootstrap 
replications. (2) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
Moreover, we also implement F-tests to test for the equality of the five quantile coefficients on 
liabilities to total assets and management team’s contract time horizon. As observed in Table 8, the 
null hypothesis of coefficient equality is rejected. 
Table 8: F-tests for equality of coefficients across different quantiles 
Leverage at the appointment date 
F ( 4,  2004) = 12.97 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
Management team’s contract time horizon  
F ( 4,  2004) = 5.15 
Prob > F = 0.0004 
Source: Computation from the author. 
Notes: F-tests based on the bootstrap method with 100 bootstrap replications. 
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Consistent with the premise that contract time horizon may influence the leverage decision 
process and a short-time managerial horizon may have reflections on capital structure decision (Antia 
et al., 2010; Berger et al., 1997), we find that the management team’s contract time horizon has a 
negative influence on leverage. It is important to recall that we measure contract time horizon as the 
average contract time horizon for the management team of each bank. These findings are consistent 
with the idea that contract time horizon may influence the leverage decision process and a short-time 
managerial horizon may have reflections on capital structure decision. However, we observe that the 
effect differs considerably, having a significant and strong effect at higher quantiles. Thus, managers 
with a shorter decision horizon will prefer higher levels of leverage, especially for highly leveraged 
banks.  
From Table 7, we observe some changes in our estimates. It turns out that some variables 
become insignificant, especially those related with manager characteristics, especially for levels of 
leverage above the median. These results may suggest, as referred by Cronqvist et al. (2012) based 
on Frank and Goyal (2009) that some observable managerial characteristics may not exert influence 
on leverage choices, and other variables that capture a manager’s preferences may be preferable in 
explaining leverage. However, it is important to note that the inclusion of the management team’s 
contract time horizon reduces the sample size to one fifth; therefore, these interpretations should be 
made with some caution. 
We observe also some noticeable differences regarding the variable experience, which changes 
its sign for the 10th and 25th percentile, although only 5% and 10% significant, respectively.  It is 
important to point out the loss of significance of the variable leverage at the appointment date at higher 
quantiles. This variable is only significant at 10% level at the 75th quantile and insignificant at the 90th 
quantile. 
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8. Concluding remarks   
One of the main objectives of this study was to raise the question how manager’s characteristics and 
traits may contribute towards explaining leverage decisions. For our purpose, we combined data from 
European banks and managers, using data on all banks from 19 countries of the Euro Area from 
Bankscope.  
The results provide evidence that younger managers are less risk averse and less conservative in 
their leverage choices, thus suggesting that they are not as concerned with career stability as older 
managers, but they desire to signal their talent following aggressive and riskier strategies. 
Nevertheless, this behaviour is constrained as banks become more leveraged. On assessing the effects 
of gender on capital structure, we observed that gender differences are not determinant, thus it may 
be the case that for management this characteristic is not determinant, as special skills are required.  
The tenure variable presents an interesting behaviour. Our departure hypothesis considered that 
tenure and leverage were negatively related, however we have found a positive relationship. The effect 
of tenure increases and becomes stronger, as leverage increases. This suggests that managers with 
a longer tenure will be more prone to increase leverage, however in spite of the influence of individual 
preferences towards financial risk, the positive effect of tenure on leverage varies according with the 
bank’s risk exposure. Thus, the lower the level of leverage at the manager’s appointment date, the 
more tenured managers will increase leverage.  
Manager’s experience has a positive influence on leverage, but it is only significant for higher 
levels. Results also suggest that bank’s leverage at the manager’s appointment date has an important 
and significant effect on leverage. Moreover, we observe that for alternative specifications, the main 
results remain similar, especially for the variable leverage at the appointment date, which remains 
significant and positive. The inclusion of the management team´s contract time horizon confirms a 
negative influence of this variable on leverage, which suggests that managers with shorter decision 
horizons will prefer more leverage, especially in highly leveraged banks. It is important to note, 
however, that the inclusion of this variable reduces the sample size. 
Our findings bring some important insights. First, it is clear that the bank’s leverage at the 
manager’s appointment date exerts a strong and positive influence on the current level of leverage, 
suggesting that managers are risk-prone; moreover the tenure variable exerts an important effect 
together with the leverage at the appointment date as tenured managers exert more influence on 
leverage when they present lower levels of leverage at the appointment date. However, the more the 
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manager distances from the appointment date, the less will be the effect of the leverage at the 
appointment date on the current level of leverage. It is also interesting to observe that the manager’s 
behaviour is constrained by higher levels of leverage, which may signal that debt may serve as a 
corporate governance tool and a disciplining device for managers, thus reducing agency costs. 
In terms of research design, our findings present important conclusions, since we have 
demonstrated that the effect of explanatory variables is not constant across the leverage distribution. 
It is clear that quantile regression techniques give us a more complete picture, allowing for the 
possibility of non-linear effects. 
Finally, the attempt to bring into this topic of discussion the relevance of the decision horizon 
expressed as the management team’s contract time horizon and its relationship with capital structure, 
has revealed some interesting paths for future research. When considering this dimension, it turns out 
that some observable characteristics become insignificant, which may suggest that other variables 
relating to a manager’s preferences or traits, will be preferable for explaining the leverage decision 
process. 
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 Appendix 
A.1. Definition of variables 
Table A.1: Variables definition 
 Variables  Definition 
Liabilities to total assets  It corresponds to liabilities divided to total assets. This ratio examines 
how much of a firm’s assets are made of liabilities. Banks with higher 
liabilities to total assets ratios, should have higher financing and debt 
service costs, than banks with lower ratios. 
Liabilities to total equity It corresponds to liabilities divided to total equity. This ratio examines 
the amount of financial debt as a percentage of equity. Banks with 
higher liabilities to total equity ratios, should have higher financing and 
debt service costs, than banks with lower ratios. 
Profitability Return on average assets (ROAA), computed as net income, divided by 
average total assets. This ratio compares the efficiency and operational 
performance of banks, as it looks at the returns generated from the 
bank’s assets. 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Tangibility Fixed assets to total assets. 
Growth opportunity Annual percentage change of total assets. 
Age A manager’s age.  
Gender Dummy variable taking value one if male and zero otherwise. 
Tenure Number of years between appointment date and current date (2015). 
Experience Number of banks for which the manager is working. 
Leverage at the appointment date Bank’s leverage (liabilities to total assets) at the manager’s 
appointment date.  
Tenure (Lag) Distance (years) between the team's tenure and manager's tenure. 
Management team’s contract time horizon Average (years) the management team’s contract time horizon. It 
corresponds to the difference between the resignation date and the 
current year 2015 (current date), computed as the average contract 
time horizon for each bank’s management team. 
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A.2. Bank specialization  
Table A.2: Bank specialization 
Bankscope Classification 
Commercial banks Mainly active in a combination of retail banking (Individuals, SMEs), Wholesale Banking 
(large corporates) and Private banking (not belonging to groups of savings banks, 
cooperative banks). 
Savings banks Mainly active in Retail Banking (Individuals, SMEs) and usually belonging to a group of 
savings banks. 
Cooperative banks Cooperative banks have a cooperative ownership structure and are mainly active in Retail 
Banking (Individuals, SMEs). 
Real Estate & Mortgage 
banks 
Mainly active in Mortgage Financing and Project Development. 
Investment banks 
 
Mainly active in Corporate Finance, Debt/Equity Issues, Mergers & Acquisitions, 
Securities Trading and usually in Private Banking. 
Other non-banking credit 
institutions 
Institutions providing guarantees, money transfer companies, companies providing 
banking and non-banking financial services to groups of financial institutions. 
Specialized governmental 
credit institutions 
Institutions providing National Development Finance, Sectoral Finance or Export/Import 
Finance. This specialisation category includes Public Institutions acting on privileged or 
protected segments, or those benefiting from Governmental guarantee or sponsoring. 
Bank holdings & Holding 
companies 
Holding companies of bank groups, which usually have very limited business activities. 
Central banks Supervising national banking systems. 
Multi-lateral governmental 
banks 
Active in multi-lateral development finance. 
Micro-financing institutions Providing micro finance to individuals and very small companies. 
Securities firms Mainly active in Securities Trading/Arbitrage activities/ Securities Brokerage/Derivatives. 
Private banking/Asset 
management companies 
Banks mainly active in private banking and asset management. 
Investment & Trust 
corporations 
 
Investment Corporations/Investment Trust Companies and Private Equity 
Companies/Property Developers and Covered Bond Issuers investing in various assets. 
Finance companies Consumer Finance Companies, Credit Card Companies, Factoring Companies, Leasing 
Companies, Trade Finance Companies 
Clearing & Custody 
institutions 
Institutions providing clearing and custody services. 
Group finance companies Companies mainly active in attracting funding for and lending on behalf of the group. 
Source: Bankscope (2015). 
Most Recent Working Paper 
 
 
NIPE WP 
09/2019 
Carvalho, Margarita e João Cerejeira, “Level Leverage decisions and manager characteristics”, 
2019  
NIPE WP 
08/2019 
Carvalho, Margarita e João Cerejeira, “Financialization, Corporate Governance and Employee 
Pay: A Firm Level Analysis”, 2019  
NIPE WP 
07/2019 
Carvalho, Margarita e João  Cerejeira, “Mergers and Acquisitions and wage effects in the 
Portuguese banking sector”, 2019 
NIPE WP 
06/2019 
Bisceglia,  Michele,  Roberto Cellini,  Luigi Siciliani and  Odd Rune Straume, “ Optimal 
dynamic volume-based price regulation”, 2019 
NIPE WP 
05/2019 
Hélia Costa e  Linda Veiga, “Local labor impact of wind energy investment: an analysis of 
Portuguese municipalities”, 2019 
NIPE WP 
04/2019 
Luís Aguiar-Conraria, Manuel M. F. Martins, Maria Joana Soares, “ The Phillips Curve at 60: 
time for time and frequency”, 2019 
NIPE WP 
03/2019 
Luís Aguiar-Conraria, Pedro C. Magalhães, Christoph A. Vanberg, "What are the best quorum 
rules? A Laboratory Investigation", 2019 
NIPE WP 
02/2019 
Ghandour, Ziad R., "Public-Private Competition in Regulated Markets", 2019 
NIPE WP 
01/2019 
Alexandre, Fernando, Pedro Bação e Miguel Portela, "A flatter life-cycle consumption profile", 
2019 
NIPE WP 
21/2018 
Veiga, Linda, Georgios Efthyvoulou e Atsuyoshi Morozumi, "Political Budget Cycles: 
Conditioning Factors and New Evidence", 2018 
NIPE WP 
20/2018 
Sá, Luís, Luigi Siciliani e Odd Rune Straume, "Dynamic Hospital Competition Under Rationing 
by Waiting Times", 2018 
NIPE WP 
19/2018 
Brekke, Kurt R., Chiara Canta, Luigi Siciliani e Odd Rune Straume, "Hospital Competition in 
the National Health Service: Evidence from a Patient Choice Reform", 2018 
NIPE WP 
18/2018 
Paulo Soares Esteves, Miguel Portela e António Rua, "Does domestic demand matter for firms' 
exports?", 2018 
NIPE WP 
17/2018 
Alexandre, Fernando, Hélder Costa, Miguel Portela  e Miguel Rodrigues, "Asymmetric 
regional dynamics: from bust to recovery", 2018 
NIPE WP 
16/2018 
Sochirca, Elena e Pedro Cunha Neves, "Optimal policies, middle class development and human 
capital accumulation under elite rivalry", 2018 
NIPE WP 
15/2018 
Vítor Castro e Rodrigo Martins, “Economic and political drivers of the duration of credit 
booms”, 2018 
NIPE WP 
14/2018 
Arash Rezazadeh e Ana Carvalho, “Towards a survival capabilities framework: Lessons from 
the Portuguese Textile and Clothing industry”, 2018 
NIPE WP 
13/2018 
Areal, Nelson e Ana Carvalho, “Shoot-at-will: the effect of mass-shootings on US small gun 
manufacturers”, 2018 
NIPE WP 
12/2018 
Rezazadeh, Arash e Ana Carvalho, “A value-based approach to business model innovation: 
Defining the elements of the concept”, 2018 
NIPE WP 
11/2018 
Carvalho, Ana e  Joaquim Silva, “The Work Preferences of Portuguese Millennials - a Survey of 
University Students”, 2018 
NIPE WP 
10/2018 
Souza, Maria de Fátima e Ana Carvalho, "An Organizational Capacity model for wine 
cooperatives", 2018 
NIPE WP 
09/2018 
Kurt R. Brekke, Tor Helge Holmås, Karin Monstad e Odd Rune Straume, "How does the type of 
remuneration affect physician behaviour? Fixed salary versus fee-for-service", 2018 
NIPE WP 
08/2018 
Martins, Susana e Cristina  Amado, "Financial Market Contagion and the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis: A Smooth Transition Approach", 2018 
NIPE WP 
07/2018 
Amado, Cristina,  Annastiina Silvennoinen e  Timo Teräsvirta, “Models with Multiplicative 
Decomposition of Conditional Variances and Correlations”, 2018 
NIPE WP 
06/2018 
Lisi,  Domenico, Luigi Siciliani e  Odd Rune Straume, “ Hospital Competition under Pay-for-
Performance: Quality, Mortality and Readmissions”, 2018 
NIPE WP 
05/2018 
Magalhães, Pedro C. e Luís Aguiar-Conraria, “Procedural Fairness, the Economy, and Support 
for Political Authorities”, 2018 
